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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ERWIN MOTZKUS and LUCILLE 
MOTZKUS, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
MARVIN CARROLL and ELVA 
DWEEN CARROLL, his wife, and 
MRS. RUTH KEMPTON, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and 
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, Trustee for Carl M. 
Hansen, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8706 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ZION'S SAVINGS BANK & 
TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEE FOR CARL M. HANSEN 
STATEMENT 
How did Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company (trus-
tee for Carl M. Hansen) get into this boundary line suit 
between the plaintiffs, Motzkus, and the defendants Car-
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2 
roll? It was thus : the Motzkus complaint was in two causes 
of action (R. 9) : 
1. One against defendants Carroll (alone) for 
trespass upon the "Southerly 4 feet" of 
property plaintiffs Motzkus are buying on 
contract from the Bank-trustee, and for 
actual and exemplary damages against the 
Carrolls (claimed at $1200.00 and $2000-
.00) . The Bank was not-could not be-a 
party to that cause of action for trespass 
by defendants Carroll. 
2. An additional (third) cause of action1 
against the Carrolls in which the Bank-
trustee (as seller to plaintiffs Motzkus) 
was also joined as defendant. 2 Here plain-
tiffs Motzkus charged the defendants Car-
roll and Kempton made adverse claims to 
said 4 feet and prayed a determination of 
its ownership and demanded that if owner-
ship of the 4 feet were not held to be in the 
Bank-trustee (as seller for the benefit of 
the plaintiffs Motzkus, the purchasers) 
they be awarded damages for loss of "busi-
ness" and loss of "property" (set at $1200-
.00 and $4000.00) along with survey costs 
and attorneys' fees. 
Obviously, if the disputed property were adjudged to 
be owned by the Bank-trustee (seller), the Motzkus damage 
claims against the Bank would fail. That is exactly what 
happened. 
1Cause of action No. 2 was stricken (R. 9). 
2Ruth Kempton (Carrolls' seller) was also made defendant in the 3rd 
cause of action. 
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Ownership of the disputed strip revolved about a pur-
ported old fence which defendants Carroll asserted estab-
lished a boundary by "acquiescence" between property on 
the North (being sold by the Bank to Motzkus) and prop-
erty on the South (being sold by defendant Kempton to 
Carrolls). That claim, if valid, would have taken from the 
South boundary of the Motzkus property the 4 feet claimed, 
shrinking its frontage from 115.54 feet to 111.54 feet along 
State Street (on the East side between 33rd and 39th 
South) and would have awarded a bonus accordingly to 
Carrolls (on the South) expanding their State Street front-
age to 61.77 feet from 57.77 feet actually called for in their 
contract, as agreed between them and their seller (Kemp-
ton). (Exhibit P-2, Motzkus Purchase Contract, July 17, 
1953. Exhibit D-24, Carroll Purchase Contract, July 1, 
1955.) 3 
But the trial judge on all the evidence adduced found 
the ownership of both tracts to be exactly as set forth and 
described in the respective purchase contracts, and that 
the boundaries (Motzkus' South line and Carrolls' North 
line) "coincided" (R. 168). That meant there was no short-
age in the land being sold to plaintiffs Motzkus by the Bank-
trustee and, of course, that the plaintiffs had not been dam-
aged. So the court gave them nothing against the Bank, 
and dismissed. 4 
3Reference to the 4 feet is taken from the complaint. No evidence ever 
showed where the purported fence, if any, was actually located and 
the trial court accordingly found "the exact location of said purported 
fence line has not been determined or established herein" (R. 167). 
4The court awarded plaintiffs no damages against the Carrolls either. 
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4 
Carrolls and Kempton (their seller) appeal from the 
judgment adjudicating the boundary in accordance with 
the contract descriptions. They claim a boundary by ac- RES 
quiescence was established by the evidence. Til1 
Plaintiffs Motzkus have not appealed from the dismis-
sal of their damage claims against the Bank-trustee. 
501 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENT BANK-TRUSTEE CONCURS IN 
THE BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS MOTZKUS. 
Respondents Motzkus have ably presented the side 
of the case upholding the trial judge's decision that no 
boundary by acquiescence was established. The Bank-trus-
tee concurs in that brief . 
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POINT II. 
THE LOCATION OF THE PURPORTED 
FENCE LINE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED, AS 
THE COURT PROPERLY DECIDED. 
"The burden of proof upon an issue as to a 
boundary is upon the party having the affirmative 
of that issue." 8 Am. Jur., Boundarie,s §90. 
"Likewise, one who claims acquiescence in a line 
as the boundary between his property and that of an 
adjoining owner has the burden of proving it." 11 
C. J. S., Boundaries §104, P. 698. 
See also Nelson vs. DaRouch (Utah) 50 P. 2d 
273. 
The trial court found that defendants Carroll asserted 
an interest in a "portion" of the Motzkus property lying 
South of an old fence line-
"* * * but that the exact location of said 
purported fence line has not been determined or es-
tablished herein" (R. 167). 
That was all the trial court could find from the evidence 
in this case. No witness said exactly where the purported 
fence had been. No survey was ever made to locate its pur-
ported line. Here, for example, is a sample of the testimony 
on which Carrolls-who had the burden of proof-relied 
to establish a fence-line boundary by acquiescence and their 
ownership of the strip of land up to that fence line: 
"VERL STATEN (R. 83). 
"Q. Is there a fence between those two prop-
erties? 
"A. Yes, sir." 
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"AMBER PATTERSON (R. 90). 
"Q. Is there a fence between those properties? 
"A. There was when I left there (a year ago)." 
"MILDRED LEE FLANAGAN (R. 99). 
"Q. Was there a :fence on the North of the 
property? 
"A. There was a fence from State Street back 
to Second East." 
"LAWRENCE J. COX (R. 106). 
"Q. Is there a fence between the Carroll prop-
erty and the Motzkus property? 
"A. There was." 
When pressed on cross examination about the location 
of the supposed fence line, Cox could not give it at all (R. 
113): 
"Q. You don't know, is that your testimony? 
"A. No." 
"CECELIA L. SPRINGMAN (R. 114). 
"Q. Is there a fence between the Carroll and 
Motzkus properties? 
"A. There was, yes." 
"RUTH J. KEMPTON (R. 121). 
"Q. Was there a fence between the property 
that you lived upon and the property that Mr. Han-
sen lived upon and owned? 
"A. Yes." 
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That was defendants' case for a fence-line boundary by 
"acquiescence". Now here did any witness fix the exact 
location of the purported fence. Defendants had the burden. 
They had to prove in that regard (1) that there was an old 
fence line, and, (2) where it was. Whether an old fence line 
was proved or not, they failed to "determine or establish 
the exact location of its purported line".5 
It will not do to say it may have been about so many 
feet from such-and-such a place. We were dealing with 
valuable property and property rights. The court was being 
asked to deviate from long established deed and survey lines 
and take property from one owner and hand it over to an-
other-up to a purported fence line. And, to do so, the 
burden was on defendants to show where that line was 
located, so that the court could definitely describe--by legal 
description-the exact line up to which he would take prop-
erty from one owner and award it to another-if he should. 
Defendants had the burden. Surveyors were used abun-
dantly, as the record shows. But none were called to run 
the location of that purported fence line. It may have been 4 
feet from the survey line here ; 1 foot there; 1 inch some-
where else ; on the survey line at another point; it might 
even have crossed over and angled off across Carrolls' prop-
erty along its tortuous course. Who knows? 
The location of the purported fence line was never es-
tablished by any evidence. The court properly found so 
5Quoting from the court's finding (R. 167). 
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and dismissed. The language in Glenn vs. Whitney (Utah) 
209 P. 2d 257, 258 is appropriate: 
"The mere fact that a fence happens to be put 
up * * * for a long period of time will not 
establish it as a true boundary." 
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POINT III. 
CARROLLS' CONTRACT TO PURCHASE DOES 
NOT INCLUDE THE PURPORTED 4-FOOT 
STRIP IN CONTROVERSY. 
Here are the two properties : 
'II 495.8 ft 
7' 
Description starts here-
Z1on' s Sa v1ngs Bank-Motzkus tract 
# 
: - - - - - - - Pui;>!;rted i:r;o~6e8a~a)o~ bo~d;ry- - - - - -
0 ~ ..., 301.8 ft ..., 194 ft 
~ ~ 
~ Kempton-Carro 11 tract ~ 
~ ~ 
Description starts here- ~ 
101 8 f't ~~~ 
Sketch is schematic only 
Not drawn to scale 
Not proportional by dimensions 
i 
Korth 
The sketch shows the purported 4-foot controversy-
within the broken line. It also shows the two properties as 
they are described in the two purchase contracts: (1) in 
the Motzkus contract with the Bank-trustee, and, (2) in 
the Carroll contract with Mrs. Kempton. 
Both properties front on State Street. The South-to-
North calls along State Street in the descriptions in the two 
contracts are : 
Motzkus Contract-115.54 feet. 
(Ex. P-2.) 
Carroll Contract-57.77 feet. 
(Ex. D-24.) 
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All Carrolls are purchasing then is 57.77 front feet. 
That is all Mrs. Kempton agreed to sell. That is all Carrolls 
agreed to buy. That is all Carrolls are entitled to. No more. 
Yet, Carrolls contend they should get 4 feet more-61.77 
feet. 
On a contract to buy 57.77 feet, Carrolls claim 
they should get 61.77 feet. 
But that was not their contract. It was a 57.77-foot 
contract; not a 61.77 -foot one. But Carrolls want the court 
to make it a 61.77-foot contract. However, courts cannot 
make a new contract for the parties : 
''Courts cannot make for the parties better 
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied 
to make." 12 Am. Jur., Contracts §228. 
Thus, the court cannot make a 61.77-foot contract for 
Carrolls who were "satisfied" to make a 57.77-foot one. 
And: 
"The court is not at liberty, either to disregard 
words used by the parties, descriptive of the subject 
matter or of any material incident, or to insert words 
which the parties have not made use of." 12 Am. 
Jur., Contracts §228. 
Thus, the court may not disregard the words 57.77 feet 
used by the parties as "descriptive of the subject matter" or 
insert the words 61.77 feet "which the parties have not 
made use of". Yet that would be exactly the result if the 
trial court's proper judgment were not upheld. 
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"Neither a court of law nor a court of equity 
can interpolate in a contract what the contract does 
not contain." 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, §228. 
So Carrolls cannot claim a purported extra 4 feet. Mrs. 
Kempton had a legal right to contract to sell them what 
she would-1 foot, 10 feet, etc., etc. She chose to agree to 
sell them 57.77 feet only; and Carrolls agreed to buy that 
limited frontage. 
The result: assume for argument (without our admit-
ting) that the purported extra 4 feet frontage had actually 
inured to the Kempton property through a supposed change 
in boundary by "acquiescence" (which we say was never 
proved), making the Kempton frontage 61.77 feet, and we 
' have this: 
1. Mrs. Kempton contracted to sell only a part 
of her tract to Carrolls-57.77 feet. 
2. Mrs. Kempton did not contract to sell the 
remaining part of the supposed tract to 
Carrolls--4 feet-but retained it herself; 
and the court cannot re-write or expand the 
Carroll contract to include for Carrolls the 
supposed 4 extra feet. 
But Mrs. Kempton does not claim the supposed extra 
4-foot tract along the supposed fence line. She has never 
claimed the same, as shown by her conversation with Motz-
kus (in March, 1954), when the survey markers were 
pointed out to her (R. 30) : 
"A. We were just talking in a friendly sort of 
manner and the topic of the survey was brought up 
at the time. We showed her where our marker was 
and there was no objections." (Motzkus' testimony.) 
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While Mrs. Kempton was in court and testified, she did 
not deny that conversation or claim she objected to the sur-
vey as pointed out to her by Motzkus. In fact, she explained 
that she made no claim to the fence line or the fence and 
did not care when Motzkus tore down the fence (R. 123): 
"A. Well, no. He tore it down, but then I told 
him it did not belong to me so I didn't care." 
Mrs. Kempton does not claim the supposed extra foot-
age. Carrolls' purchase contract does not include it. And 
the trial court properly adjudged the boundary between the 
two properties was along the survey and contract line. 
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POINT IV. 
MRS. KEMPTON, IN EFFECT, "DISCLAIMED", 
AS THE COURT FOUND. 
It is not contended that Mrs. Kempton ever disclaimed 
by writing. The finding is (R. 168) : 
"8. That defendant Ruth Kempton in August, 
1953 knew of the survey boundary line and dis-
claimed interest in and to the property lying North 
of said boundary line in that in June, 1955, said 
defendant Ruth Kempton told the plaintiffs to re-
move a small fence running Easterly and Westerly 
near the South boundary of plaintiffs' land in the 
Western portion of plaintiff's property, stating that 
said fence was not on her ground." 
The disclaimer mentioned in the finding was not in-
tended to mean a formal written one, but a disclaimer by 
word or action only. The finding must be considered in its 
entire context; then it is apparent that the disclaimer there-
in talked about was simply one where Mrs. Kempton told 
Motzkus she did not claim the fence or fence line. That is 
made plain when we consider the next finding (No.9) that 
Motzkus, subsequent to and in reliance on that "disclaimer" 
constructed the South unit of his motel where he did (R. 
169). 
The court's finding of Mrs. Kempton's disclaimer was 
correct. 
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POINT V. 
THE ADJOINING PROPERTIES ARE WITHIN 
AN OFFICIAL PLAT AND SURVEY BY 
WHICH THE TRUE BOUNDARY COULD BE 
LOCATED. NO UNCERTAINTY COULD EX-
IST REGARDING THE BOUNDARY. 
A boundary by acquiescence arises only where there is 
uncertainty over the true boundary location. That is the law 
in Utah. This Court so ruled again as late as 1955. Jensen 
vs. Bartlett (Utah) 286 P. 2d 804. Mr. Justice Wade pointed 
out in the Jensen case that where the true boundary is 
known, although parties agree that it shall be at another 
place and erect a fence to mark it and acquiesce therein 
"for a long period of time", such acquiescence will not es-
tablish a different boundary because-
"* * * the establishment of such a boun-
dary line would have the effect of tran~ferring real 
property by parol agreement contrary to our stat-
ute." 286 P. 2d 804, 805. 
The opinion continued : 
"Here the court found that there is no official 
or original plat or survey by which the boundary line 
can be located, and the evidence shows that the dif-
ferent surveyors do not agree on the location of the 
boundary line." 286 P. 2d 804, 806. 
And so the Court finally said : 
"This clearly creates sufficient uncertainty on 
which to base a finding of a boundary line by ac-
quiescence." 
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But, in our case, there was and is an "official or orig-
inal plat or survey by which the boundary line can be lo-
cated": 
Ten Acre Plat "A", Big Field Survey. See 
Exhibit P-11. Abstract of Title (Title Page, Map 
therein, etc.) . 
From that official plat or survey, the true boundary 
could easily be located at all times. Both lots lie within Lot 
7, Block 17, of said Plat, as the abstract of title shows. 
(Exhibit P-11). The description of each tract is tied to 
Lot 7 of said Official Plat: 
The Zion's Saving Bank-Motzkus tract is tied 
to the 1Vortheast corner of said lot 7 (cornrnencing 
at a point South oo 06' West 114.76 feet and South 
89° 53' West 200 feet from the Northeast corner 
of Lot 7). (Exhibit P-2, Motzkus Purchase Con-
tract). 
The Kempton-Carroll tract is tied to the South-
east corner of the 1V orth Half of Lot 7 ( cornrnencing 
at a point which is North 0° 06' East 114.76 feet 
and South 89° 53' West 394 feet from the Southeast 
corner of the North Half of Lot 7). (Exhibit D-24, 
Carroll Purchase Contract) . 
Each tract (and the true boundary line between them) 
could at all times be ascertained from the official plat or 
survey. Jensen vs. Bartlett, supra. 
Furthermore, the two "different surveyors" agreed 
upon the survey line. Mack Kesler surveyed it for Motzkus 
in August, 1953; again in July, 1955 (R. 70, 72). Bush & 
Gudgell also meanwhile surveyed. Each surveyor put a 
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"plug" in the sidewalk at the boundary line. And the two 
plugs agreed perfectly: 
"Q. Yours and Gudgell's came right together. 
"A. Yes. I have the records there, and in 
chaining the line, as we did, we agreed perfectly, 
and we put in the plugs, and they agreed perfectly, 
as close as you can get two plugs (R. 154) ." 
Thus, no uncertainty existed or could exist over the 
true boundary line in this case because ( 1) there was an 
"official plat or survey by which the boundary line could 
be located" at all times, and, (2) the "different surveyors" 
agreed, perfectly, on the boundary. Without such uncer-
tainty, no boundary by acquiescence could result. Jensen vs. 
Bartlett, supra. 
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POINT VI. 
THIS COURT CANNOT CHANGE THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT AS TO THE BOUNDARY 
ON THE EAST 194 FEET OF THE MOTZKUS 
TRACT IN ANY EVENT. 
The Carroll-Kempton property does not adjoin the 
Zion's Savings Bank-Motzkus tract along the latter's East 
194 feet. The two adjoin only along the West 301.8 feet of 
the Zion's Savings Bank-Motzkus tract. That is clear from 
the exhibits. 
Exhibit D-15 (Large sketch). 
Exhibit P-17 (MackS. Kesler survey map). 
See sketch herein, page 12. 
The owner of the tract adjoining the Zion's Savings 
Bank-Motzkus property on the South, along the East 194 
feet thereof (whoever he may be) was not a party to the 
action and is not before the court. A boundary along that 
portion could not be adjudicated in his absence. 
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POINT VII. 
PLAINTIFFS MOTZKUS HAVE NOT AP-
PEALED FROM THE JUDGMENT DISMISS-
ING THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAM-
AGES AGAINST THE BANK-TRUSTEE. THAT 
DISMISSAL IS, THEREFORE, FINAL AND 
MUST STAND. 
At the outset, we pointed out that one of plaintiffs 
Motzkus' causes of action (3rd) was directed against the 
Bank-trustee, demanding damages ( $1200.00 and $4000.00) 
for loss of "business" and loss of "property", etc., if the 
Motzkus property were found short by the purported 4 feet 
involved. (See P. 2.) Judgment was against the plain-
tiffs in favor of the Bank-trustee (R. 173) : 
"6. That plaintiffs' complaint and each and 
every cause of action thereof be and is hereby dis-
missed as against defendant Zion's Savings Bank & 
Trust Company, trustee for Carl M. Hansen, and 
said defendant have judgment against plaintiffs, no 
cause of action." 
No appeal was taken by plaintiffs from that judgment 
of dismissal against them. Only the Carrolls and Mrs. 
Kempton (co-defendants of the Bank-trustee) appealed. 
Their appeal was from only a portion of the judgment-
that part which held the true boundary prevailed over the 
assumed fence-line boundary by "acquiescence". (Notice 
of Appeal, R. 178.) 
Plaintiffs Motzkus had the right to appeal from the 
dismissal of their damage claim against the Bank-trustee. 
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There can be no doubt of that. But they did not. That dis-
missal is now a final judgment against them--since it has 
not been appealed. 
"If less than all of several coparties appeal from 
a severable judgment in which the interests of the 
parties are independent, the appellate court may 
reverse only the part of the judgment pertaining to 
appellants." 5 C. J. S., Appeal & Error, §1920. 
In Rosenthyne vs. Matthews-McCulloch Co. (Utah) 
168 P. 957, plaintiff sued to cancel a deed. The trial court's 
judgment did two things: 
( 1) A warded plaintiff judgment cancelling the 
deed, but, 
(2) Awarded defendant judgment for money 
against the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff only appealed; and only from part (2) above 
(the portion of the judgment awarding money against her). 
Part (1) was not appealed (the deed-cancellation portion 
of the judgment). This court (1) reversed the money judg-
ment portion appealed from, but (2) found itself powerless 
to interfere with the deed-cancellation portion because no 
appeal had been taken (by defendant) from that part. It 
said: 
"In this jurisdiction it has repeatedly been held 
that, in case a judgment is divisible, either party 
who feels himself aggrieved may appeal from the 
whole or any part thereof. To that effect is the 
statute (Comp. Laws, 1907, §3305), which in part 
provides: 
"'An appeal is taken by filing with the 
clerk of the court in which the judgment or 
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order appealed from is entered a notice stating 
the appeal from the same, or some specific part 
thereo/.'6 
"The plaintiff complied with the statute by 
specifically stating in the notice of appeal that she 
appealed only from that part of the judgment which 
was in favor of the company and against her. The 
company was thus notified that the plaintiff did not 
bring up the whole judgment for review, and if the 
company desired to have any other part of the judg-
ment reviewed, it should have brought it up to this 
court by cross-appeal." Rosenthyne vs. Matthews-
McCulloch Co., supra. 
Here, as in the Rosenthyne case, by the Carroll-Kemp-
ton Notice of Appeal-
" (Plaintiffs Motzkus) were thus notified that 
(defendants Carroll and Kempton) did not bring 
up the whole judgment (the dismissal in favor of 
the Bank-trustee and against plaintiffs Motzkus) 
for review." 
And, to paraphrase the Rosenthyne opinion: 
"If the (plaintiffs Motzkus) desired to have any 
other part of the judgment reversed (they) should 
have brought it up to this court by appeal." 
But they did not. They did not appeal from the portion 
in favor of the Bank-trustee against plaintiffs Motzkus 
which dismissed their damage claims against the Bank-
trustee, and that dismissal is now a final judgment. 
6The Rule now states the Notice of Appeal "shall designate the judg-
ment or part thereof appealed from". U. R. C. P. 73(b). 
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While, as we contend, the judgment was correct in all 
its portions and must, therefore, be affirmed, still, if the 
court should now reverse, it can reverse only the portion 
within the single appeal of defendants Carroll and Kempton, 
namely, the portion upholding the survey and contract line 
as the true boundary over the claimed fence-line boundary 
by "acquiescence". That is all that was appealed from. 
Only Carroll and Kempton appealed. The court cannot 
reverse the portion dismissing plaintiffs Motzkus' damage 
claims apainst the Bank-trustee-for plaintiffs Motzkus 
have not appealed from that. The judgment of dismissal 
is now final. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company, 
trustee for Carl M. Hansen, submits: 
1. The side of the case upholding the trial judge's de-
cision that no boundary by acquiescence was established has 
been ably presented by Respondents Motzkus. The Bank-
trustee concurs in their brief. 
2. The location of the purported fence line was not 
established, as the court properly decided. 
3. Carrolls' contract to purchase does not include the 
purported 4-foot strip in controversy. That contract called 
for 57.77 feet only. That is all Mrs. Kempton agreed to sell; 
all Carrolls agreed to buy, and all they are entitled to. The 
court cannot make a new 61.77-foot contract for Carrolls. 
And Mrs. Kempton does not claim the purported extra 4 
feet. She "disclaimed" any interest in it, as the court found. 
4. The two properties are within an official plat or 
survey-Lot 7, Block 17, Ten Acre Plat "A", Big Field 
Survey-as shown by the abstract of title (Exhibit P-11). 
Therefore, the true boundary between them could easily be 
located at all times and no uncertainty could exist. Jensen 
vs. Bartlett, supra. Without uncertainty, a boundary by 
acquiescence cannot be established or prevail over a true 
boundary line. 
5. The court cannot change the trial court's judgment 
as to the boundary on the East 194 feet, in any event. The 
Kempton-Carroll tract does not adjoin the Zion's Savings 
Bank-Motzkus tract along that portion. The owner of that 
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tract (whoever he may be) is not before the court and a 
boundary line along that portion could not be adjudicated 
in his absence before the court. (See sketch, P. 12.) 
6. Plaintiffs Motzkus have not appealed from the 
judgment dismissing their cause of action for damages 
against the Bank-trustee. That dismissal is, therefore, final 
and must stand. Even were this court to reverse (on this 
appeal taken by defendants Carroll and Kempton alone) 
the judgment of dismissal (between the Bank-trustee and 
plaintiffs Motzkus) must stand, for the plaintiffs have 
not appealed therefrom and that judgment is final. 
The judgment of the trial court is correct and must be 
affirmed, with costs to the Respondent Bank-trustee against 
appellants Carroll and Kempton. 
December, 1957. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS & ARMSTRONG, 
H. P. Thomas, 
Frank Armstrong, 
Edward M. Garrett, 
Attorneys for above Respondent. 
511 Walker Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah. 
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